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UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT

Farrar v. Hobby,

_U.S._, 92 D.A.R. 16669,
No. 91-990 (Dec. 14, 1992).
Party Winning Nominal
Damages in Civil Rights Action
is Prevailing Party, But May
Not Be Entitled to Fees
In an underlying proceeding, petitioners sought $17 million in compensatory
damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sections
1983 and 1985; the complaint, which
named six Texas public officials as defendants, was based on an alleged deprivation
of liberty and property without due process by means of conspiracy and malicious prosecution. Although the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Texas awarded petitioners only $1 in damages, it awarded them $280,000 in attorneys'
fees under 42 U.S.C. section 1988, the
Civil Rights Attorneys' Fee Award Act of
1976. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the fee award, holding that petitioners were not prevailing parties and
were therefore ineligible for fees under
section 1988. The Fifth Circuit noted that
even if an award of nominal damages represented some sort of victory, it was a
technical victory so insignificant as to be
insufficient to support prevailing party
status.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court
noted that to be considered a prevailing
party within the meaning of section 1988,
a plaintiff must be able to point to a resolution of the dispute which changes the
legal relationship between itself and the
defendant. According to the court, "a
plaintiff 'prevails' when actual relief on
the merits of his claim materially alters the
legal relationship between the parties by
modifying the defendant's behavior in a
way that directly benefits the plaintiff."
Referring to its previous rulings, the Court
noted that an award of nominal damages
for deprivation of the absolute right to
procedural due process recognizes the importance to organized society that this
right be scrupulously observed, while remaining true to the principle that substantial damages should be awarded only to
compensate actual injury. Following from
this premise, the Court held that a plaintiff
who wins nominal damages is a prevailing
party under section 1988: "[a] judgment
for damages in any amount, whether com-

pensatory or nominal, modifies the
defendant's behavior for the plaintiff's
benefit by forcing the defendant to pay an
amount of money he otherwise would not
pay."
Although holding that the prevailing
party inquiry does not tum on the magnitude of the relief obtained, Justice Thomaswriting for the majority on this issuenoted that it does bear on the propriety of
fees awarded under section 1988, noting
that once civil rights litigation materially
alters the legal relationship between the
parties, "the degree of the plaintiff's overall success goes to the reasonableness" of
a fee award. The majority noted that petitioners received nominal damages instead
of the $17 million in compensatory damages they had sought; "[t]his litigation
accomplished little beyond giving petitioners 'the moral satisfaction of knowing
that a federal court concluded that [their]
rights had been violated' in some unspecified way." Accordingly, the majority concluded that even though they technically
"prevailed" under section 1988, petitioners were not entitled to receive attorneys'
fees in this case, in light of the degree of
the success obtained.
Justice White, joined by Justices
Blackmun and Stevens, dissented from the
majority's decision that plaintiff deserved
no fees in this case. "That issue was neither presented in the petition for certiorari
nor briefed by petitioners." The dissent
would have remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings on the issue of reasonable fees.

UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURTS

family would have received in the state of
prior residence. This new residency requirement became effective upon approval by the U.S. Secretary of Health and
Human Services on October 29, and the
California Department of Social Services
(DSS) began applying it shortly thereafter.
Plaintiffs contend that the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the
U.S. Constitution; further, plaintiffs point
out that, for the last twenty years, the U.S.
Supreme Court has "consistently struck
down as unconstitutional state statutes
that provide reduced government benefits
to new state residents." In response, DSS
Director Eloise Anderson claims that prior
court rulings only overturned laws that
completely denied benefits to new residents, while section 11450.03 seeks only
to limit the amount newcomers receive.
On December 22, the court granted
plaintiffs' motion for temporary restraining order, blocking application of the durational residency requirement; at this
writing, plaintiffs are seeking a preliminary injunction.

CALIFORNIA SUPREME
COURT
Johnson v. Bradley,

4 Cal. 4th 389, 92 D.A.R. 17340,
No. S021118 (Dec. 24, 1992).
Proposition 73 Does Not Preclude
City From Adopting Public
Funding Provisions Of
Campaign Reform Measure

Green v. Anderson,

No. Civ. S-92-2118.
Groups Seek to Block
New State Welfare Law
On December 21, a class action was
filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California by a group
of California residents who moved or relocated to California within the preceding
twelve months and sought welfare benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. Pursuant
to new section 11450.03 of the Welfare
and Institutions Code, until an applicant
for AFDC has resided in the state for
twelve consecutive months, the applicant's
level of benefits may not exceed what the
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Measure H, adopted by the voters of
the City of Los Angeles in 1990, amended
the city charter and created a comprehensive campaign, election, and ethics reform
plan by setting forth limitations on campaign contributions, limitations on the
total amount of contributions that a candidate may accept in any election, prohibitions on the transfer of contributions between candidates or their controlled committees, required disclosure of candidates'
economic interests and income, limitations on gifts and honoraria that public
officials may accept, and campaign spending limitations, and by providing for the
creation of a city ethics commission to
oversee, administer, and enforce the new
ethics code.
In this original mandamus proceeding,
petitioners-Assemblymember Ross
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Johnson, Senator Quentin Kopp, and Los
Angeles City Council member Ernani
Bernardi-sought to invalidate and enjoin
enforcement of Measure H, to the extent
the measure provides for the partial public
funding of campaigns for city elective offices. Petitioners grounded their challenge
on Proposition 73, a statewide initiative
which was cosponsored by Johnson and
Kopp and passed by the voters in the June
1988 election. Among other things, Proposition 73 bans public financing of any
election campaign. Specifically, Proposition 73 added Government Code section
85300, which provides that no public officer shall expend and no candidate shall
accept any public moneys for the purpose
of seeking elective office.
As part of its determination whether
there is an actual conflict between general
state law and charter city authority, the
court declined to address an initial claim
raised by amicus curiae that section 85300
has been rendered inoperative as a result
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals'
decision in Service Employees International Union, et al. v. Fair Political Practices Commission, 955 F.2d 13 I 2 (I 992),
which struck down Proposition 73's contribution limits applicable to all campaigns for election to state and local office. [12:2&3 CRLR 275] Instead, the
court proceeded with its analysis, based in
part on its finding that the case before it
presents "an important issue of constitutional Jaw that potentially affects all charter cities."
The court then considered whether section 85300 qualifies as a matter of "statewide concern," noting that if the state statute does not address as a matter of statewide concern, the conflicting charter city
measure is a "municipal affair" and is
"beyond the reach of legislative enactment." If section 85300 does address a
statewide concern, the court must consider
whether it is both reasonably related to the
resolution of that concern, and narrowly
tailored to limit incursion into legitimate
municipal interests.
The court noted that petitioners presented several alternative arguments in
support of their claim that section 85300
addresses a statewide concern. However,
the only argument in which the court
found merit was petitioners' claim that the
integrity of the electoral process-at both
the state and local level-is a statewide
concern. However, in considering whether
section 85300 is reasonably related to the
resolution of this statewide concern, the
court found that petitioners "cite[d] nothing to support the proposition that section
85300's ban on public funding of political
campaigns advances in any way the goal
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of enhancing the integrity of the electoral
process. In fact, the opposite appears to be
true .... [A)ssuming spending limitations
may enhance the integrity of the electoral
process, a ban on public funding would
actually frustrate achievement of that
goal." Accordingly, the court concluded
that "section 85300 is not reasonably related to the statewide concern of enhancing the integrity of the electoral process.
Having reached this conclusion, we need
not address whether the statute is also
narrowly tailored to avoid unnecessary incursion into legitimate areas of local concern."

Clark v. Burleigh,
4 Cal. 4th 474, 92 D.A.R. 17309,
No. S020854 (Dec. 24, 1992).
State Regulation Governing
Statement By Candidates for Local
Nonpartisan Elective Office Does
Not Violate First Amendment
In this proceeding, the California Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of Elections Code section JOO 12.1,
which prescribes the content of a statutory
"candidate's statement" that a candidate
for local judicial office may prepare and
file for inclusion in the voter's pamphlet;
the statute provides that such a statement
must be limited to the candidate's name,
age, occupation, and a brief description of
the candidate's own background and qualifications, and must not refer to those of
other candidates for the office. Plaintiff,
Monterey County Registrar of Voters,
filed an action for declaratory relief, seeking a judicial determination whether the
candidate's statement submitted by Judge
William Burleigh, which made specific
references to another candidate, violated
section JOO I 2.1 and, if so, whether the
statute is unconstitutional; Judge Burleigh
filed a cross-petition for writ of mandate
to compel the registrar to publish his statement as written. The trial court found that
Judge Hurleigh's statement violated section I 0012.1, upheld the constitutionality
of section I 0012.1, struck from the statement the references to the other candidate,
and directed the Registrar to print the remainder in the voter's pamphlet. On an
appeal filed by Judge Burleigh, the Sixth
District Court of Appeal reversed the decision, holding section 10012.1 unconstitutional on the ground that it violates the
free speech guarantee of the First Amendment.

The California Supreme Court initially
noted that section I 00 I 2.1 implicates a
candidate's First Amendment rights, since
the amendment '"has its fullest and most
urgent application"' to political speech.
However, the court noted that "[n)othing
in the Constitution requires the Government freely to grant access to all who wish
to exercise their right to free speech on
every type of Government property without regard to the nature of the property or
to the disruption that might be caused by
the speaker's activities."
The court noted that the U.S. Supreme
Court has adopted a forum analysis as a
means of determining when the government's interest in limiting the use of its
property to its intended purpose outweighs the interest of those wishing to use
the property for other purposes; the extent
to which the government may control access depends on the nature of the relevant
forum. For purposes of such forum analysis, the U.S. Supreme Court has divided
all public property into three categories:
(I) The traditional public forum is a
place that by long tradition has been used
by the public at large for the free exchange
of ideas; laws regulating the content of
speech in such forums are subject to strict
scrutiny.
(2) The designated public forum is
property that the government has opened
for expressive activity by part or all of the
public; a content-based regulation of speech
in a designated public forum is subject to
strict scrutiny.
(3) The nonpublic forum is all remaining public property; limitations on expressive activity conducted in a nonpublic
forum need only be reasonable, as Jong as
the limitation is content-neutral.
The court determined that the voter's
pamphlet is not a traditional public forum,
since it is a creature of recent legislation.
The court also found that the pamphlet is
not a designated public forum, since the
government does not create a designated
public forum by inaction or by permitting
limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for
public discourse. Accordingly, the court
noted that the pamphlet constitutes a nonpublic forum, which may be reserved for
its intended purposes as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an
effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's
view.
The court opined that the primary purpose of the candidate's statement is to give
the voters at least a minimal amount of
basic information about the background
and qualifications of little-known candidates. "In light of that purpose it is plainly
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reasonable for the Legislature to provide
in section I 0012.1 that the statement
should not also be used by the candidates
as a partisan campaign device to attack
their opponents." The court also noted that
section I0012.1 restricts on! y this one channel of communication with the voters; numerous alternative channels remain open
to candidates for local judicial office that
do not bar criticism of opponents. Finally,
the court found that the challenged restriction is viewpoint-neutral, and does not
constitute an effort to suppress expression
based on content. Accordingly, the court
held that section I 0012.1 does not violate
the free speech guarantee of the First
Amendment.
The court briefly addressed Judge
Hurleigh's contention that section 10012.1
denies him equal protection of the laws
under the Fourteenth Amendment because
candidates for nonjudicial local offices are
not subject to its restrictions. The court
dismissed this argument, noting that on
government property which constitutes a
nonpublic forum, not all speech is equally
situated, and the state may draw distinctions which relate to the special purpose
for which the property is used. The court
noted that Judge Burleigh did not have a
fundamental right to attack his opponent
in this nonpublic forum; therefore, the
state's prohibition against such attacks
will be upheld if it is rationally related to
a legitimate state purpose. As noted above,
the court concluded that the restriction is
rationally related to the legislature's legitimate purpose of assisting the voters by
, providing them with basic information
about the background and qualifications
of little-known candidates for local judicial office; accordingly, the court held that
section I 0012.1 does not violate the equal
protection clause .
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